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Peer Influence on Payout Policies
Abstract
Using a large sample of US public companies, we find robust evidence that firms’ payout
policies, i.e., dividends and share repurchases, are significantly influenced by the policies of their
industry peers. To overcome endogeneity problems, we employ instrumental variable techniques
based on peers’ stock price shocks. Peer influence on payouts is more pronounced among firms
that face greater product market competition and operate in better information environments.
With regards to dividends, firms, especially smaller and younger firms, are more sensitive to
industry peers that are similar to them in size and age. However, mimicking repurchases is
concentrated among large and mature firms only. Peer influence on dividends, compared to
repurchases, seems more stable across firm and industry conditions. Overall, peer influence on
dividends, and, to a less extent, on repurchases, is consistent with a rivalry-based theory of
imitation, which posits that firms imitate peers’ actions to maintain their competitive parity.
JEL: G35
Keywords: Payout Policy; Dividend policy; Share Repurchases; Peer effects; Mimicking;
Imitation
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Peer Influence on Payout Policies
“Virtually all board and senior management analysis related to dividend decisions starts with
in-depth peer benchmarking.”
-

Dividends: The 2011 Guide to Dividend Policy Trends and Best Practices (J. P. Morgan)

1. Introduction
Economic theory suggests that individuals and firms often have incentives to imitate each
other. Duflo and Saez (2002) find that individuals’ retirement savings behaviors are highly
influenced by their peers. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that managers can sometimes avoid
negative reputations by ignoring their private information and imitating the actions of others. By
imitating, managers who are concerned about their reputations in the labor market send signals to
others about their own quality. Surveys of corporate executives also have found that managers
consider peer firms’ decisions when choosing their own firms’ policies (see, e.g., Graham and
Harvey (2001)). Lieberman and Asaba (2006) review large literature on imitation and propose
two broad theories of why firms imitate each other: 1) information-based theory, which suggests
that firms follow other firms that are perceived to have superior information, and 2) rivalry-based
theory, which suggests that firms imitate their rivals to maintain competitive parity or limit
rivalry.
Despite ample theoretical support and anecdotal evidence of peer influence, empirical
research on the causal effect of peer firms on corporate policies is rather limited. A notable
exception is a recent study by Leary and Roberts (2014), who show that corporate capital
structure choices are highly interdependent, and that peers’ capital structure is the most important
observable determinant of a firm’s capital structure. Patnam (2011) finds positive industry peer
effects in investment and R&D among Indian public companies. In related work, Fracassi (2016)
finds that managers are influenced by their social peers when making corporate policy choices.

1
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In this paper, we examine whether firms are influenced by their industry peers’ policies
when making payout policies such as whether to pay and how much to pay via dividends or
share repurchases. Finance research acknowledges the importance of peers in payout (and other)
policies, mainly by including industry fixed-effects and industry averages in empirical models.
However, the literature has yet to establish that peers have a causal effect on a firm’s payout
policy. Most studies implicitly assume that firms make their decisions in isolation, only based on
firm-specific characteristics. So an examination of peer effects can add to our knowledge about
how firms set payout polices. For example, evidence of peer effects may imply that managers’
hands are effectively tied when a firm’s peers pay dividends, causing investors to expect the firm
to do the same. In fact, based on a survey of corporate managers, Brav, Graham, Harvey and
Michaely (2005) point to this possibility by concluding that “With respect to payout policy, the
rules of the game include … do not deviate far from the competitors; …” (p. 523). Moreover, an
understanding of peer effects may help answer why dividends tend to be so persistent, and
whether this tendency to conform to industry peers snowballs into the phenomena of
disappearing and reappearing dividends, and their concentration, found by previous studies (see,
e.g., Fama and French (2001), Hoberg and Prabhala (2008), Julio and Ikenberry (2004), and
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004)).
Payouts are one of the most important decisions made by a firm, and cash dividends have
been the primary payout method for centuries. Theoretical literature gives ample explanation for
why firms may imitate each other’s payout policies. Perhaps the strongest theoretical support for
mimicking dividends comes from an inertia-based explanation of dividends.1 The original
purpose of dividends was to make stocks easy to price by making them comparable to debt
because dividends provide the most direct statistic for firm valuation. The sheer popularity of
dividend discount models in finance textbooks speaks to the importance of dividends as an
important metric for stock valuation. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that dividends are
perceived as valuable by both retail investors (see, e.g., Graham and Kumar (2006)) and
institutional investors (see, e.g., Ben-David, Glushkov, and Moussawi (2010)). Not surprisingly,
practitioners and analysts commonly cite dividend payouts as a measure of valuation, especially

1

See Ben-David (2010) for a review of this literature.
2
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when comparing firms in the same industry.2 This ‘valuation-as-yardstick’ concept proposes that
firms manage their dividends in order to help investors value their stream of cash flows by
making the firm comparable to their peers. Consequently, when these firms compete in capital
markets, they have strong motivations to react to each other’s dividend policies.
A prediction from the ‘valuation-as-yardstick’ concept is that dividend changes are
correlated within industries. If investors use the same dividend yield to price firms within an
industry, a change in dividend payout by one firm is expected to be followed with payout
changes in the same direction by peer firms who like to remain comparable to peers. This notion
is supported by Firth’s (1996) finding that a dividend announcement by a firm also affects the
valuations of other firms in its industry.
Alternatively, signaling motivations also provide a plausible explanation for mimicking
behavior. Lintner (1956) argues that a dividend increase signals management’s belief that
earnings are going to increase. Signaling theory argues that owing to asymmetric information,
dividends are explicit signals about future earnings, sent intentionally by management to
shareholders (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979, Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985)).
Empirical evidence also supports that firms pay dividends in order to convey information to
shareholders (see, e.g., DeAngelo, De Angelo and Skinner (1996), and Benartzi, Michaely and
Thaler (1997)). Clearly, to the extent that (1) dividends are effective signals that attract investors’
attention and (2) firms compete with each other for this positive attention, they have an incentive
to mimic peer firms’ dividend policies. Moreover, this incentive to mimic is likely to be stronger
among firms in more competitive industries, in which it is more difficult to differentiate the firm
based on products. It is also likely to be more pronounced among younger firms, which do not
have an established history of operations and have a greater need to be comparable with peers in
order to obtain favorable valuations.

2

Consider the following excerpt from a U.S. News & World Report story: “Yes, Apple already
pays a dividend. That’s true. But it’s also a shamelessly insufficient dividend. … While on the
surface MSFT’s [Microsoft’s] 2.5 percent dividend is comparable to Apple’s 2.1 percent yield,
using the payout ratio exposes just how different the shareholder capital return philosophies
are.” Why Apple (AAPL) Needs to Double Its Dividend Immediately (Aug. 16, 2016,
http://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-08-15/apple-inc-aapl-stock-dividend-coulddouble)
3
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On the other hand, share repurchases have become an increasing important method of
payout. In fact, the decrease in dividends is almost entirely substituted by an increase in share
repurchases (see Grullon et al. (2011)), and firms often substitute one form of payout with the
other depending on investors’ preferences and market conditions (see Li and Lie (2006)). In
addition, Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007) show that firms sometimes strategically mimic
repurchase decisions of other firms to signal their competitiveness to the market.
Consistent with these predictions, we find that a firm’s decisions on whether to start
paying dividends, how much dividend to pay, and whether and how much to repurchase are
significantly influenced by those of its industry peers. To overcome endogeneity concerns, we
follow Leary and Roberts (2014) and employ an instrumental variables (IV) technique. We use
industry peers’ idiosyncratic stock return shocks and idiosyncratic risks as instruments for peers’
dividend policies. Results from IV regressions indicate that peer firms have a causal effect on
both payout policies – dividends and repurchases. While the ability to repurchase shares enables
firms to deflect peer pressure to initiate dividends, share repurchases do not significantly affect
peer pressure on the amount of dividend subsequent to dividend initiation.
Finally, we examine the heterogeneity in peer effects to better understand the reasons
behind peer influence on payouts. We find that peer influence on both forms of payout is
stronger among firms that face more intense product market competition. In general, peers are
more influential to firms that are of similar size and age as themselves. Smaller and younger
firms are especially more influenced by their peers’ dividend policies, but mimicking
repurchases is concentrated among larger and mature firms. Moreover, peer influence on
dividend is more pronounced among firms that operate in better information environments, i.e.,
firms in industries that are followed by more analysts and where stock trading conveys less
private information. These patterns collectively support the rivalry-based motive for mimicking
proposed by Lieberman and Asaba (2006). Our findings do not provide strong support for the
signaling motive for mimicking payouts.3 Finally, we find that the announcement effects of

3

This conclusion is consistent with Leary and Michaely’s (2011) inference that the evidence of
dividend smoothing does not support a signaling motive, and Brav et al. (2005)’s survey
evidence that managers reject the notion that they pay dividends to signal firm quality.
4
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dividend increases are more positive when the resulting dividend is close to peers, but no similar
pattern is evident for dividend decreases. This asymmetry does not appear to be caused by time
variation in the premium that investors attach to dividends (see Li and Lie (2006)).
To our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to identify the causal effect of peer
firms on a firm’s payout policies. The closest study to ours is a concurrent working paper by
Popadak (2017), who analyzes peer effects in the context of Lintner’s partial-adjustment model
of dividends. Our paper differs from Popadak’s in several ways. First, unlike Popadak, we
examine dividend initiation, which is a more important decision than dividend continuation
because once firms start paying dividends, they rarely stop. Second, while Popadak finds no
evidence of a peer effect in repurchases, we find a strong effect of peers in the decision to
repurchase as well as the amount of repurchases.4 Third, we examine potential interactions
between dividends and share repurchases, which Popadak does not. Finally, because existing
theories of dividends such as signaling are not supported by previous empirical and field studies
(see, e.g., Leary and Michaely (2011), and Brav et al. (2005)), we seek explanations of peer
influence on payout from theories beyond the finance literature. We find that peer influence on
dividends fits a simple but well-founded rivalry-based theory of mimicking proposed by
Lieberman and Asaba (2006).
This work is related to important prior research by Leary and Roberts (2014), who find
that capital structure choices within an industry are highly interdependent, and Fracassi (2016)
and Patnam (2011), who show that related firms make correlated financial choices. Our paper
also complements Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007), who find that repurchase decisions are
correlated within an industry, but attempt to establish causality indirectly via cross-sectional tests
only. Our paper offers cleaner evidence of a causal effect (i.e., mimicking, rather than a response
to common industry shocks) by using well-established instrumental variables that are plausibly
independent of common industry shocks. Additionally, our paper examines potential

4

This difference in our results may be because Popadak analyzes quarterly data, while we
examine annual data. Since firms usually repurchase shares out of temporary cash flows (see
Jagannathan, et al. (2000), which tend to be sporadic, looking for a peer effect in repurchases
with quarterly data may impose too high a hurdle to find an effect.
5
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complementarity or substitution in mimicking different types of payouts.5 More broadly, our
paper is also related to prior research on how a firm’s actions or outcomes affect its industry
peers (see, e.g., Foster (1981) and Baginsky (1987) for earnings; Firth (1996), Howe and Shen
(1998) and Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) for dividends; Eckbo (1983) for mergers; Lang and
Stulz (1992) for bankruptcies; and Servaes and Tamayo (2014) for control threats).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses identification
challenges and introduces our instrumental variables (IV). Section 3 lays out our empirical
methodology and explains the construction, relevance, and validity of our instruments. Section 4
presents firm-level summary statistics. Section 5 presents the main empirical tests, including IV
regressions. Section 6 discusses potential motives for peer influence on payout by using a
theoretical framework. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Identification challenges and instrumental variables
The idea of peer effects on payouts is intuitive and grounded in theory. However,
empirical tests of peer effects are challenging because of the ‘reflection problem’ highlighted by
Manski (1993). Specifically, a positive correlation between a firm’s payout policy and the
policies of its industry peers does not confirm that peer effects exist because firms may adopt
similar dividend policies simultaneously in response to common industry shocks. For example,
changes in investment opportunities or tax incentives may lead all firms within an industry to
change their dividend policies simultaneously.6
The ‘gold standard’ for overcoming such an identification problem requires randomly
assigning peers to each candidate firm. Unfortunately, this approach is not feasible with
observational data in which firms’ peers are fixed. An alternative solution entails the following:
1) identify shocks that affect some firms in the peer group but not others, and 2) test how the
5

Moreover, Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen (2007) find a stronger peer effect among
concentrated industries using HHI based on sales. We use a newer and arguably better measure
of product market competition, and find that both dividend and repurchase mimicking are more
prevalent in more competitive industries.
6

Many studies in social sciences have recognized a positive correlation among peer behavior but
have warned against making causal inferences about peer effects (see Angrist, 2014).
6
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affected firms’ responses to these shocks change the behavior of their peers that are unaffected
by these shocks. This strategy lies at the heart of our empirical technique.
To test how a firm, say firm i, is affected by payout policies of its peers, an ideal
approach would be to collect ‘events’ that are relevant only for i's peer firms’ policies, but are
random with respect to firm i's own policies. However, most such events are not readily
observable to a researcher, and, more importantly, it is extremely difficult to ascertain that these
events do not directly affect firm i.7 Fortunately, firms’ stock price changes, which impound the
information about these events, are readily observable. These changes can be decomposed into
systematic (i.e., common) components and firm-specific shocks by using asset-pricing models
such as Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factor models. We follow Leary and Roberts
(2014), who adopt this strategy in constructing their instrumental variables to study peer effects
on capital structure. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we define peer firms as all other firms
in the same three-digit SIC industry code in a given year. We identify shocks to peers’ payout
policies via their stock return shocks (idiosyncratic returns) and idiosyncratic volatilities, which
we use in instrumental variables models. Section 3.2 offers an extensive discussion of why these
instrumental variables are relevant for peers’ dividend and repurchase policies. For now, we note
that the empirical strategy here is to exploit heterogeneity in peer firms’ payout policies caused
by idiosyncratic equity shocks they experience. Accordingly, in the first stage of our
instrumental variables regressions, we predict peer firms’ dividend and repurchase policies with
the peer firms’ average stock price shocks and the variance of these shocks. In the second stage,
we use the peers’ predicted (instrumented) payout policies to explain firm-specific payout
policies.

3. Empirical methodology
To estimate peer effects on dividends, we employ the following empirical model, which
is similar to one used by Leary and Roberts (2014):

7

Leary and Roberts (2014) highlight this problem with the help of an example of CEO death. An
accidental death of a CEO of a firm j appears to be a random event for any other firm k (≠ j). But
this event can impact firm k directly via shifts in CEO labor markets and unanticipated changes
in product markets.
7
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∝

′

(1)

The indices i, j and t correspond to firm, industry, and year respectively. The outcome
is a measure of the payout policies of firm i in industry j and year t. Peer firms are

variable

defined as all firms in the same three-digit SIC code, except firm i, in a given year. The variable
denotes peer firms’ average dividend or repurchase policy (average of all firms in industry j
except firm i in year t). We assume that

is endogenous, which calls for using instrumental

variables. Following Leary and Roberts, we use a contemporaneous

measure instead of a

lagged measure because peer effects are likely identified more cleanly if there is insufficient time
lag for other variables to have an influence. The vectors

and

contain peer firm averages

and firm-specific characteristics, respectively, as control variables;
effects; and

represents year fixed

is the firm-specific error term that is assumed to be correlated within the firm

and heteroskedastic. Therefore, all our regression specifications have heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors clustered within firms (Peterson (2009)).
3.1 Construction of the instruments
To parse out the firm-specific stock price shock, we follow Leary and Roberts (2014) but
also augment our model with size, book-to-market and momentum factors (Fama-French (1993)
and Carhart (1997)) as follows:

,

where

2

refers to the total stock return for firm i in industry j over the month t.

excess market return,
momentum factor, and

is size factor,

is the book-to-market factor,

is the
is the

is the excess return on an equally weighted industry (three-

digit SIC code) portfolio, excluding firm i's return. We include the last factor in the model to
remove any common variation in stock returns across the industry.
We estimate equation (2) for each firm on a rolling annual basis using historical monthly
returns. We require at least 24 months of historical data and use up to 60 months of data in the
8
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estimation. Most of the estimates use 60 months of data. As an example, in order to obtain
expected and idiosyncratic returns for COKE from January 2000 to December 2000, we first
estimate equation (2) using monthly returns from January 1995 to December 1999. Then using
the estimated coefficients from equation (2) and monthly factor returns from January 2000 to
December 2000, we use equation (3) to compute the expected and idiosyncratic returns as
follows:
≡
∝
3

≡ ̂
Here the letters with hats indicate estimated parameters. To obtain the expected and
idiosyncratic risk of 2001, we repeat the same process by updating the estimation sample from
January 1996 to December 2000 and use the estimated betas for 2001 returns. This process
generates new beta estimates each calendar year.
Understanding the importance and relevance of this instrument is crucial for accepting
the inferences made in this study. The return shock, ̂

, obtained from the above model is the

return of the firm after removing all known sources of systematic variation (i.e., exposure to
market, size factor, book-to-market factor, and momentum factor). To the extent that the FamaFrench and Carhart factor models explain the cross-section of stock returns, the residuals
obtained from this model for any firm i should be purely firm-specific and uncorrelated with
those of any other firm k (≠ i). Our model goes even further and augments the four-factor model
to remove any remaining correlation among

with industry average excess return
the firms in the industry.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the estimated factor regressions. The average
(median) number of months per rolling regression over the year is 54 (60). The majority of the
regressions have a full five-year (60 month) window. The R-squared seems reasonable with a
9
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mean of .307 and a median of .288. The factor regressions load positively on market, size, and
book-to-market factors and negatively on the momentum factor. Industry beta has the smallest
load in absolute terms, which suggests that the four factors are successful in removing most of
the systematic variation in the stock returns. The average idiosyncratic return is roughly 10 basis
points.8
For each firm i, we calculate the annual return shock by taking the geometric average of
the monthly idiosyncratic returns obtained this way. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation
of monthly return shocks for the year. Finally, we obtain averages of the annual return shocks
and idiosyncratic risks for firm i’s peers by averaging these variables across all firms in the same
three-digit SIC industry, excluding firm i, in a given year. We use these peer average equity
shocks and risks as instrumental variables for predicting peers’ dividend and repurchase policies.
3.2 Relevance and validity of the instruments for peers’ dividend and repurchase policies
The conclusions in this paper largely depend on the quality of our two instrumental
variables, peers’ average stock return shocks and peers’ idiosyncratic risk. To be valid, an
instrument needs to satisfy two conditions: 1) relevance criterion, i.e., it should be strongly
correlated with the endogenous regressor, which is peers’ dividend and repurchase policies in
this study, and 2) exclusion restriction, i.e., the instrument should not have a direct effect on the
dependent variable, which are firm-specific dividend and repurchase policies in this study.
We first discuss the relevance criterion, i.e., why these instruments predict peers’
dividends and repurchase decisions. With regards to dividends, we find that peers’ equity return
shock and idiosyncratic risk both strongly predict peers’ dividend decisions plausibly because
these variables contain information about peers’ future performance relevant for cash dividends.9
Specifically, these instruments are strong predictors of peers’ future profitability and cash flow
volatility, both of which are among the most important determinants of dividends identified by

8

By construction, the average idiosyncratic return should be zero. It is non-zero due to loss of
observations in the data cleaning process.

9

Leary and Roberts (2014) use only peers’ average return shock as the instrument for financial
leverage.
10
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previous studies. For example, Fama and French (2001) find that the likelihood of paying
dividends increases with profitability. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) find that firms
tend to increase dividends during periods of earnings growth. Benito and Young (2003), Ferris,
Sen, and Yui (2006), and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) present similar evidence for UK
firms, and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) find similar results among European Union firms.
Denis and Osobov (2008) present worldwide evidence that dividends are concentrated among the
largest and most profitable firms. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find that firms that
increase dividends in year t have experienced significant earnings increases in years t-1 and t,
and firms that cut dividends in year t have experienced a reduction in earnings in years t and t-1.
On the other hand, cash flow volatility predicts dividends payouts negatively (see, e.g., Bradley,
Capozza and Seguin (1998), and Minton and Schrand (1999)) because cash flow uncertainty
makes external financing costly. Moreover, the penalty for having to reduce dividends because
of cash flow uncertainty also is severe.
Next, we present an analysis that demonstrates how our instruments are related to the
variables that are important determinants of dividends. Table 2 presents the results of regressions
of peers’ average future profitability and cash flow volatility on peers’ average idiosyncratic
equity shock (Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and equity risk (Peer Idios. Equity Risk) using firm-fixed
effects. Column 1 shows that peers’ equity shock [risk] positively [negatively] predicts their
future profitability (Peer Profitabilityt+1) in a highly significant manner, even after controlling
for a host of other variables related to future profitability, including current profitability. This
finding implies that these two instruments contain information about the market’s expectations of
peers’ future profitability above and beyond the information contained in their current
profitability and other characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 show that these instruments also predict
peers’ profitability up to three years in the future. Finally, in column 4, the dependent variable is
peers’ average future cash flow volatility (Peer Cash Flow Risk(t+1, t+5)), calculated as the average
standard deviation of cash flows over the next five years. This test uses non-overlapping data
using five-year intervals during the sample period. As expected, Peer Idios. Equity Risk (Peer
Idios. Equity Shock) predicts peers’ future cash flow volatility positively (negatively) and in a
highly significant manner. These results suggest that Peer Idios. Equity Shock and Peer Idios.
Equity Risk contain information about the market’s expectation about peers’ future profitability

11
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and cash flow risk, which are important determinants of dividends. This analysis offers a strong
rationale for the relevance of these two variables as instruments for peers’ dividend policies.
We expect our instruments to predict peers’ repurchase policies somewhat differently.
Unlike dividends, repurchases are not viewed as a permanent commitment by a firm, so
repurchases are not as strongly dependent on the level of future profitability as dividends are.
Rather, due to market timing incentives, firms are more likely to repurchase their stock to exploit
potential undervaluation (see, e.g., Dittmar and Field (2015)). Therefore, if positive idiosyncratic
stock returns also reflect potential undervaluation and hence lack of market timing opportunities,
our first instrument (Peer Idios. Equity Shock) should predict peers’ repurchases negatively.
Consistently, Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find direct evidence that repurchases
are followed by poorer market performance whereas dividend increases are followed by good
performance. On the other hand, repurchases do involve large cash outflows. So, just like
dividend decisions, repurchase decisions likely depend on a firm’s ability to maintain stable cash
flows in the future. Therefore, firms which expect to have riskier cash flows are less likely to
repurchase stocks and save cash for tapping into potential investment opportunities. Hence, we
expect that peers’ idiosyncratic risk, which we have found to represent peers’ future cash flow
risk in Table 2, should negatively predict peers’ repurchases. Our instrumental variables analysis
later on obtains results consistent with these predictions.
Next, we briefly discuss the exclusion restriction on the instruments. For this study,
exclusion restriction requires that our two instruments, peer firms’ stock returns and risk shocks,
should affect firm-specific dividend policies only via their effect on peers’ dividend policies.
Leary and Roberts (2014) make a convincing case for the exclusion restriction. The idiosyncratic
part of stock returns and risks are obtained as the residuals from a Fama-French and Carhart
model. This model is well-regarded in the asset-pricing literature for its ability to decompose
stock returns into those due to common factors and due to firm-specific shocks. Moreover, we
include excess industry return as an additional factor in the model to help remove any industryspecific commonalties in stock returns. Therefore, the residuals obtained from this model are
plausibly purely firm-specific. Leary and Roberts (2014) show that these shocks have some
desirable statistical properties that support their exogeneity: these shocks are serially
uncorrelated and serially cross-uncorrelated, which means that firms’ shocks do not forecast
12
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future shocks for themselves or for their peers. Moreover, as shown later, our instruments pass
the tests of over-identification (e.g., Hansen’s J), which further supports the validity of our
instruments.

4. Data and summary statistics
The primary data on public firms’ financials and stock prices come from the CRSPCOMPUSTAT merged database. The full sample runs from 1965 to 2010. Following previous
studies (e.g., Leary and Roberts (2014)), we exclude financial (6000=<SIC code=<6999),
utilities (4900=<SIC code =<4999) and government entities (SIC code>9000) because these
industries are highly regulated. For some additional tests, we obtain product market fluidity data
from Hoberg and Phillips’s data library, probability of informed trading (PIN) data from
Professor Stephen Brown’s website, and analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S. The main variables
used in this study are described in the Appendix.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of our final sample of about 98,270 firm-year
observations. The final sample consists of about 9,180 unique firms over our 46-year sample
period. There are about 240 industries identified by three-digit SIC codes in our sample. The
typical industry has a median of 14 firms and a mean of 32 firms. To mitigate the influence of
outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. The table provides
summary statistics for firm-specific variables and peer average variables separately. About 47%
the firm-years pay cash dividends, and 35% of firms repurchase shares. Each year, about 3.5% of
last year’s non-payers start paying dividends. The amount of dividend (share repurchase)
represents about 1% (1.2%) of assets, on average, which makes the mean total payout (the sum
of the former two) about 2.2% of total assets. The average annual equity return shock is -4%,
which is different from 0 mainly because the return shocks are annualized by compounding the
monthly shocks.10 The standard deviation idiosyncratic monthly return is 13.2%. The
distributions of other variables are similar to those in the previous literature. Not surprisingly,

10

Note that while the sum of the 12 monthly idiosyncratic returns should be zero, the
compounded return need not be zero.
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peer firm averages for all the variables are similar to individual firm averages, but the standard
deviations of peer firm averages are consistently lower than those of individual firms.

5. Peer effects on payout policies
In this section, we present and discuss the results obtained from our regression analysis.
We begin with some baseline models. Then we proceed to our instrumental variables techniques
to examine if peers have a causal influence on a firm’s payout decisions.
5.1 Decision to pay dividends or to repurchase
Table 4 presents the results from a battery of regression analyses of whether a firm’s
decisions to initiate and pay dividends or to repurchase shares are influenced by the
corresponding decisions of its peers. We start with an analysis of the decision to pay a dividend,
and then focus on the dividend initiation decision.11 The main dependent variable for columns 1
and 2 is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm pays cash dividend in a given fiscal year
(Dividend Payer). From columns 3 to 5, the dependent variable is whether a firm starts paying
dividends (Dividend Initiation). The main explanatory variable of interest in columns 1 through 5
is the fraction of peer firms who are dividend payers (Peer Div. Payers). We use different
variations of the instrumental variable Probit (IV-Probit) regressions to estimate a potential
causal effect of peers on the dividend payment decision. The control variables include a number
of firm characteristics identified in the literature as important predictors of dividend decisions.
For example, we control for future growth opportunities by including size, market-to-book ratio,
sales growth, and R&D expenses (see, e.g., Grullon and Michaely (2002), Fama and French
(2002) and Grullon, Paye, Underwood, and Weston (2009)). Likewise, we include the ratio of
retained earnings to book equity (RE/BE) to control for the life cycle stage of the firm
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006)). Similarly, we include the firm’s current profitability
and cash flow volatility to control for cash flow risk.

11

While most firms do not stop paying dividends once they start, some do. In our sample, about
4 percent of dividend payers omitted dividends at some point and 3.5 percent of non-payers
initiated dividends. This analysis captures the firms’ choice each year between retaining cash
and distributing dividends in such cases.
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The dependent variable, Dividend Payer, is a binary variable, so we estimate an
instrumental variable probit (IV-Probit) model. Column 1 shows results from the first stage of an
IV-Probit model, in which the dependent variable is Peer Div. Payers and the instruments are
lagged peers’ idiosyncratic return shocks (Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock)) and lagged peers’
idiosyncratic risk (Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk)). As expected, the results reveal that the former
(latter) variable predicts peers’ dividends significantly positively (negatively), even after
controlling for a number of other important determinants of dividends. Column 2 shows the
second-stage of the IV-Probit model, in which the fitted value of Peer Div. Payers from the first
stage (Instrumented Peer Div. Payers) predicts the firm-specific dividend decision. Consistent
with our hypothesis, Instrumented Peer Div. Payers obtains a positive and statistically highly
significant coefficient in explaining a firm’s decision to pay dividends. The estimated marginal
effect of Peer Div. Payers on the probability of a firm paying dividends, when other variables are
kept at their means, is 0.26 (p<0.01). This estimate suggests that compared to a firm with no
dividend paying peers, a firm with all dividend paying peers is 26% more likely to pay
dividends. Clearly, this is an economically significant relation. Moreover, both instruments are
individually and jointly significant at 1% levels. So our instruments are relevant in explaining the
fraction of peer firms which pay cash dividends each year. These results enable us to conclude
that peers’ policies about whether to pay dividends influence a firm’s own such a decision.
Dividend policies are sticky, which raises the question whether these results are simply
an artifact of persistent dividends, or whether peers actually influence the dynamics of a firm’s
dividend payments. To address this issue, we next examine the effect of peers’ dividend-paying
decisions on a firm’s decision to start paying dividends (Dividend Initiation). This analysis is
conducted on the sample of firms which did not pay dividends in the previous year. As shown in
column 3 of Table 4, the second stage IV-Probit model obtains a positive coefficient on
Instrumented Peer Div. Payers, which is statistically significant at the 5% level in predicting
firm-specific Dividend Initiation.

12

The result implies that firms are more likely to initiate

dividends if more of their peers pay dividends. The estimated marginal effect of Peer Div.
Payers on the probability of Dividend Initiation, when other variables are kept at their means, is
0.012 (p<0.10). This suggests that compared to a firm with no dividend paying peers, a firm with
12

The first stage results are similar to those in column 1, so they are not reported to save space.
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all dividend paying peers is 1.2% more likely to initiate dividends. This impact is economically
quite significant considering that the unconditional rate of dividend initiation is merely 3.5%.
Since firms can distribute cash back to investors either by dividends or share repurchases,
an important question is whether peer influence on dividend initiation is equally important for
firms which repurchase shares as a way of paying back the stockholders. To answer this
question, we re-estimate the instrumental variable regressions of dividend initiation separately
among the sample of non-repurchasers (column 4) and repurchasers (column 5) based on
whether they bought back any stock last year. Clearly, peer influence on initiating dividends is
concentrated among firms which do not repurchase shares. This is an important finding because
dividend initiations are perhaps one of the most important decisions in a firm’s life-cycle. Our
finding that some firms can deflect peer pressure to initiate dividends suggests that studies that
focus on dividend paying firms only (e.g., Popadak (2017)) may overestimate the importance of
peer effects on firms’ dividend policies.
Next we analyze whether firms are also influenced by their peers’ decision to repurchase
shares, and whether such influence is equally important for dividend payers and nonpayers.
Analysis of repurchase decisions, which are similar to those of the dividend paying decisions, are
presented in columns 6 through 9. Column 6 is the first stage of the IV-Probit regression, in
which the dependent variable is the fraction of peers which repurchase shares in a given year
(Peer Repurchasers) and the instrumental variables are peers’ average idiosyncratic returns and
risks (Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk)). As we hypothesized in
section 3.2, both of our instruments predict Peer Repurchasers negatively and significantly so
these instruments are strong predictors of peers’ decisions to repurchase stocks. Column 7, the
second stage of IV-Probit regression, shows that the instrumented Peer Repurchasers predicts a
firm’s decision to repurchase shares (Repurchaser) positively and statistically significantly.
Estimated marginal effect of Peer Repurchasers, evaluated when other variables are kept at their
means, is 0.16 (p<.010). In terms of economic significance, this result suggests that a firm with
all peers repurchasing is 16% is more likely to repurchase shares itself, compared to a firm with
no peers that repurchase.
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Our next two tests are aimed at analyzing whether there is heterogeneity in peer influence
in payout policy based on whether or not a firm also pays dividends. Unlike in the dividend
initiation decision, we find that peer influence in share repurchases is more pronounced among
firms which also pay dividends as shown in columns 8 and 9. This result may be because firms
tend to repurchase shares out of temporary, non-operating cash flows, while they pay dividends
out of permanent, ongoing cash flows (see Jagannathan et. al. (2000)). The cash flows of nondividend payers are more likely to be temporary. So, for distributing them via repurchases, peer
effects in repurchases may be of second order importance compared to the desire to dodge
initiating dividends. On the other hand, for firms with permanent cash flows (i.e., dividend
payers), the decision to do repurchases is more susceptible to peer influence.
Overall, this analysis shows that a firm’s decision on whether to pay dividends or to
repurchase shares is significantly influenced by the corresponding policies of its peers. Only
those firms which do not repurchase shares are likely to follow peers and initiate dividends.
However, dividend paying firms are more likely to mimic peers’ share repurchase decisions.
5.2 Amount of payout
Our analysis so far finds a strong and plausibly causal effect of peers on a firm’s decision
on whether to start paying dividends and to repurchase shares. In this section, we analyze
whether peers also influence firms’ decisions about the amount of dividends and repurchase.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms benchmark the amount of dividends they pay to the
levels of their peers’ dividends.13 An analysis of peer influence on the amount of dividend payout
is especially interesting because practitioners, as well as academics, use dividend payout ratios as
an important metric for comparative valuations (e.g., Graham and Kumar (2006)).
We employ a variety of models and variables to analyze different methods of payouts.
We obtain our main dividend payout variable by scaling annual cash dividends by total assets

13

“We believe that a best-in-class dividend policy should be based on the five CLIMB
dimensions: capital planning, long-term sustainability, investor preferences, materiality and
benchmarking to peers.” - J.P Morgan (2011), Dividends: the 2011 Guide to Dividend Policy
Trends and Best Practices.
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(Div/Assets). Following Allen and Michaely (2003) and Li and Zhao (2008), we normalize the
amount of dividends by book assets, rather than by market capitalization or earnings, to ensure
that the results are not influenced by stock price variations or affected by firms with negative
earnings.14 To parallel dividend payout measure, we calculate repurchase payout as the amount
of repurchases scaled by total assets (Repur/Assets).
Because some firms pay dividends and/or repurchase shares and others do not, all of our
payout variables are censored at zero. This feature of the data makes OLS models biased and
calls for using Tobit-based regressions, which jointly model the propensity of paying dividends
or repurchasing shares, and the amount of such payouts. For robustness, we also employ linear
models using the subsample of firms with non-zero dividends or repurchases. Table 5 presents
regression results regarding dividend payouts. The analysis summarized in panel A includes the
full sample of both dividend payers, nonpayers, repurchasers and non-repurchaers. As before, we
employ instrumental variable techniques to examine if there is any causal effect of peers’ payout
policies on firm-specific policies. As in section 5.1, the two instrumental variables for Peer
Div/Assets and Peer Repur/Assets are Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios.
Equity Risk). Column 1 of panel A shows the estimates from the first stage of an instrumental
variable Tobit (IV-Tobit) model for dividend payouts. As expected, this first-stage regression
obtains a positive [negative] and highly significant coefficient on peers’ average return shocks
[risks] in predicting Peer Div/Assets. Next, the second stage estimate (column 2) obtains a
positive and significant coefficient of 0.58 on Instrumented Peer Div/Assets in explaining a
firm’s dividend payout. These results convey that peer firms’ payout ratios have a positive causal
effect on firm-specific dividend payout ratios. Specifically, the coefficient estimate of 0.58
suggests that an increase in Peer Div/Assets ratio by 10% leads a firm to increase its own
Div/Assets ratio by about 5.8%. Clearly, in addition to being statistically significant, this effect is
also economically substantial.

14

It seems especially important to avoid stock price as the scaling factor in this study because
our instrumental variables are based on stock returns. For robustness, in unreported tests we also
use other measures such as cash dividends scaled by either total revenue (Div/Sales) or cash
flows (Div/CashFlow). Div/CashFlow is similar to the dividend payout ratio variable popular in
finance textbooks, except that the scaling variable is cash flows instead of accounting profits. We
exclude observations where Div/CashFlow is negative because of negative cash flows.
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We next estimate IV-Tobit regressions using repurchase to assets ratio (Repur/Assets) as
an alternative measure of payout. As expected, the first stage of IV-Tobit regression reported in
column (3) obtains negative and significant coefficients on both of our instruments in predicting
peers’ average repurchase ratio (Peer Repur/Assets). In column (4), the second stage regression
obtains a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 1.659 on Instrumented Peer
Repur/Assets ratio in predicting a firm’s own repurchase ratio. Specifically, the coefficient
estimate suggests that an increase in Peer Repur/Assets ratio by 10% leads a firm to increase its
own Div/Assets ratio by about 16.6%. Finally, we analyze peer influence on total payout,
calculated as the sum of dividends and repurchases scaled by total assets (Total Payout). As
shown in column 5 (second stage of IV-Tobit), consistent with the separate analysis of each
payout variable, the Instrumented Peer Total Payout ratio positively predicts the firm-specific
Total Payout ratio in a highly significant manner.
It appears that firms mimic their peers’ payouts in the form of both dividends and
repurchases. However, as we will see later, our cross-sectional tests find some significant
differences in firms’ mimicking behavior on dividends and repurchases based on firm
characteristics and market conditions. Therefore, we continue to analyze these decisions
separately in subsequent sections.
Next, we estimate the instrumental variable regressions of both type of payouts within the
subsample of firms with positive cash dividends or repurchases. These tests examine if the
evidence of peer effects on payout ratios survives among payers only, and is not an artifact of a
discrete jump from zero to a positive payout. Because these samples now do not have a point
mass of 0 in the distribution of dividend payouts, we use linear two-stage least squares (2SLS)
models for the instrumental variable analysis. Table 5, panel B presents the second stages of the
2SLS regressions for our two payout variables. The results are qualitatively similar to those
obtained from the full sample using IV-Tobit models, but the point estimate of the peers’
repurchase ratio is smaller than in Panel A.
Model diagnostics also obtain desirable results. In all cases, different variations of weak
instrument tests obtain significant test statistics, which convey that our instruments are strong
predictors of peers’ payout variables. Furthermore, in the analysis in panel B, which uses linear
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2SLS in which over-identification tests are feasible, the Hansen’s J statistic is insignificant in
both models. So these instruments appear to satisfy the exclusion restriction and appear to be
valid for the analysis of both dividends and repurchases. Overall, these features of our analysis
strongly suggest that peer firms’ payout ratios have a causal effect on a firm’s own payout ratios.
Next we analyze if peer influence on the amount of payout is different for firms that use
and do not use the alternative payout method. In other words, we ask whether peer influence on
the amount of dividends (repurchases) is larger or smaller among firms which also repurchase
shares (pay dividends). Earlier, we have found that peer influence on dividend initiation is
nonexistent for firms which repurchase shares. However, we do not necessarily expect such
heterogeneity in the amount of dividends once a firm decides to pay dividends. Initiating
dividends is a much more significant decision than the amount of dividends. As shown in panel
C, columns 1 and 2, peer influence on the amount of dividends is roughly similar for share
repurchasers and non-repurchasers. Columns 3 and 4 show that peer influence on the amount of
repurchases is somewhat stronger for dividend paying firms. The analysis of both the decision to
repurchase in Table 4 and the amount of repurchases in Table 5, panel C suggests that mimicking
repurchases is somewhat more prevalent among dividend payers. Therefore, it is likely that some
dividend payers also do occasional repurchases, influencing their peers to follow suit.
We next present some robustness checks of our main findings. One concern is that the
observed relation between a firm’s payout and its peers’ payout may be due to all firms in an
industry responding to time-varying dividend premiums. When the dividend premium is high, all
firms pay more dividends, and vice versa. This possibility should be largely controlled for by our
instrumental variables analysis because IVs plausibly contain purely firm-specific news so they
should be uncorrelated with any market- or industry-wide factors (recall that our model for
computing the idiosyncratic stock return shock controls for peer average return). Moreover, we
include year fixed effects that largely control for any time-varying dividend premium.
Nevertheless, a lingering concern is that the dividend premium may vary across
industries, which we not have accounted for adequately. We deal with this issue in several other
ways. First, we calculate the value-weighted dividend premium every year following the
approach used by Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Lie (2006)). Based on the time-series
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median of the annual dividend premiums, we split our sample by high and low dividend
premium years, and re-estimate our regressions separately in the two subsamples. As presented
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, panel D, we find that peer influence on dividend exists during
both high and low dividend premium years but it is stronger during low dividend premium
years.15 This result may reflect the possibility that during years of high dividend premiums, firms
have an incentive to pay higher dividends to cater to investor preferences, so they are less
affected by what peers do. That is, in high dividend premium years, investors’ preference for
dividends dominates peer effects. On the other hand, dividend payment becomes more
discretionary during low dividend premium years, which makes firms more susceptible to peer
effects. Similarly, as shown in columns 5 and 6, peer influence on repurchases only exists
significantly in the years with low dividend premiums. One interpretation of this finding is that
during low dividend premium years, firms have more discretion not only over how much
dividend to pay, but also over whether to pay dividends or repurchase shares, making them more
prone to peer effects. Second, we control for potential industry variation in dividend premium by
including year x industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects in the models.16 Columns 3 and 7 of
Panel D show the second stage of 2SLS models, in which peer influence continues to remain
positive and significant both for dividends and repurchases, respectively, even after controlling
for these fixed effects. Finally, we employ firm-fixed effects models which can control for any
time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity (including exposure to industry-level dividend
premiums). Columns 4 and 8 show these results from the second stages of 2SLS, in which peer
influence continues to be significant for the levels of both dividends and repurchases. These
results collectively indicate that the observed peer effect is unlikely to be entirely driven by
variation in aggregate dividend premiums.
To summarize, we consider both dividend and repurchase amounts and employ a variety
of estimation models to examine peer effects on payout policies. Collectively, the results
15

Consistent with the prior literature, we find that unconditionally, firms are more likely to pay
dividends in high premium years than in low premium years (56% vs. 35%).
16
Here we use the Fama and French (1993) 48-industry classification even though our peers are
defined at the 3-digit SIC levels. We do this for two reasons. First, there are 240 unique SIC
codes and 45 years in our sample. It is unlikely that dividend premium will vary at such a
granular level of industry classification. Moreover, combining 3-digit SIC with years leads to
more than 10,000 fixed effects and potentially over-parameterizes our models.
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strongly suggest that a firm’s decisions about how much to pay in dividends and repurchases are
significantly influenced by the decisions of its industry peers. While peer influence on dividends
seems largely independent of aggregate dividend premiums, mimicking of repurchases is
prevalent only in years with low dividend premiums.

6. Reasons behind peer effects in payouts
In this section, we attempt to identify the reasons why firms mimic their peers’ payout
policies. Based on an extensive review of the literature on firms’ imitation behavior, Lieberman
and Asaba (2006) propose two broad reasons why firms imitate each other: 1) rivalry-based
theory 2) information-based theory. They also provide a roadmap for empirical tests that may
distinguish between these two motives. In essence, their framework suggests that firms likely
imitate peers to maintain competitive parity or to limit rivalry, as predicted by the rivalry-based
theory, if all of the following three conditions are met:17
A.

Firms compete in same market or niche, and

B.

they are of similar size or resource, and

C.

information environment is not highly uncertain
If any of the above conditions are not met, mimicking may be consistent with an

information-based theory, which suggests that firms imitate their better-informed peers. For
instance, younger firms may follow their older peers if they believe the latter are better informed
about product markets and investors. In the next sections, we attempt to test the role of these
three conditions on peer influence on dividends.
6.1 Product market competition
Regarding condition A, in a less competitive environment, product differentiation is
relatively easier. So there is less need to imitate other firms’ payout decisions to signal a firm’s
own quality to investors. For instance, despite sitting on a huge cash balance, Apple Inc. did not
pay dividends for many years, while many of its competitors did. However, investors
consistently placed high valuations on Apple mainly because of the perceived high quality and
17

See, Lieberman and Asaba (2006, p. 376, Fig. 1).
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uniqueness of its products. On the other hand, increased competition with more players and more
homogeneous products makes product differentiation difficult. This makes mimicking payouts
more important for signaling quality and competing in the capital market.
By construction, peers in our sample are firms that share the same three-digit SIC code,
which is quite a narrow industry classification. So firms within each of these industries are likely
to compete with each other in similar markets. But the degree of competition can vary across the
industries. So we conduct one more empirical experiment to test the merit of condition A. First,
from Hoberg and Phillips’s (2016) website, we obtain data on firms’ exposure to product market
competition based on how similar a firm’s products are to those of its rivals. Hoberg and Phillips
derive this measure, known as ‘total similarity’, based on how firms describe themselves in the
product description section of their 10-K filings. The authors show that this classification does a
better job of identifying high competition environments and rivals than the traditional industry
classifications do. Moreover, this classification allows the set of a firm’s competitors to vary
over time. We define a firm as facing more [less] intense competition in the product market if the
‘total similarity’ score for its products is above [below] the median.
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of our analysis on the subsamples of firms that
operate in more and less competitive environments. Each column presents the results from the
second stage regressions of an IV-Tobit model. For each payout variable, Div/Assets and
Repur/Assets, the point estimate on the instrumented peer average is significantly larger among
more competitive firms than among less competitive firms.18 This result favors condition A and
suggests that peer effects on payouts are stronger among firms that compete more fiercely in the
product markets.

18

Ideally, we would also want to test if the coefficient estimates across the two subsamples are
statistically different from each other, which would be a straightforward exercise for linear
models. However, these results are from second stages of nonlinear IV Tobit models, in which
reliable tests for such comparisons are not readily available. Therefore, we focus on the
differences in economic magnitude.
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6.2 Who mimics whom? Leaders and followers based on size, age and asset tangibility
This section presents an analysis aimed at testing the merit of condition B. The rivalrybased theory predicts that in order to maintain their competitive parity with peers, firms would
mimic the payout policies of peers which are similar to them in size, age and ease of valuation.
On the other hand, the information-based theory predicts that firms that are smaller, younger and
harder-to-value would follow the policies of larger, older and easier-to-value firms, which are
likely better-informed about product and capital markets. We examine which of these theories is
supported by the data. We partition the sample into three terciles by firm size, based on market
capitalization each year. We define smaller firms as the firms in the bottom tercile and larger
firms as the firms in the top tercile of the size distribution. We then construct the peer average
payout variables and the two instrumental variables separately within smaller or larger peers. In
the same fashion, we define older, younger, less tangible and more tangible firms and construct
the payout ratios and the instrumental variables for each peer group separately.
In the first two columns of Table 6, panel B, we estimate the regressions of dividend
payouts (Div/Assets) only among the subsample of smaller firms. We compute peer average
dividend payout and the instrumental variables using the subsample of smaller (larger) peers in
column 1 (2). The goal is to examine whether small firms mimic the dividend decisions of their
smaller industry peers or larger ones. Similarly, in columns 3 and 4, we estimate the regressions
only within the subsample of larger firms. Again, we calculate the peer payouts by averaging the
payout ratios of the smaller (larger) peers in column 3 (4). The aim is to examine whether larger
firms mimic the dividend decisions of their smaller or larger peers in the industry. We follow a
similar approach to analyze younger firms in columns 5 and 6, older firms in columns 7 and 8,
and less/more tangible firms in columns 9 through 12. Columns 13 to 24 repeats this analysis for
Repur/Assets as the dependent variable.
Each column in Table 6, panel B shows results of second-stage regressions from IV-Tobit
models. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on small peer firms’ instrumented average payout
ratio (Small Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets) is positive and much larger in magnitude than that
on the large peers’ ratio (Large Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets) in predicting a smaller firm’s
dividend payout. The implication is that smaller firms are more influenced by dividend decisions
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of other smaller firms. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of large firms’ decisions to follow
peers’ policies. We find that Small Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets has no significant effect on
large firms’ payout, but Large Peers’ Instrumented Div/Assets has a significant positive effect on
large firms’ payouts. So it appears that larger firms are influenced by the dividend decisions of
their larger peers only. The strongest peer effect (0.552) seems to run from smaller peers to
smaller firms. Similarly, the results in columns 5 through 8 reveal that younger (older) firms are
more strongly influenced by the dividend decisions of their younger (older) industry peers. The
point estimate is the largest (0.409) for the younger peers’ effect on younger firms. Finally,
columns 9 through 12 analyze leaders and followers in terms of ease of valuation, measured by
their asset tangibility (PP&E/Assets ratio). We find that dividend policies of less tangible firms
(PP&E/Assets ratio < Median) are influenced by both types of peers: more and less tangible. On
the other hand, more tangible firms are influenced by the decisions of their more tangible peers
only.
Columns 13 through 24 present the results of corresponding analyses for the amount of
repurchases. In general, peer influence in repurchase amounts exists mainly among larger, older
and more tangible firms, which mimic the actions of their larger, older and more tangible
industry peers. Unlike dividend payout decisions, smaller, younger and less tangible firms do not
mimic the amount of repurchases of their peers.
Overall, it appears that firms’ dividend decisions are mainly influenced by the industry
peers in their own size and age cohorts. The magnitude of this influence seems to be the largest
among smaller and younger firms. For repurchases too, peer influence generally seems to exist
among their own cohorts. These findings support the rivalry-based theory, rather than the
information-based theory, of peer influence in dividends.
6.3 Information environment
This section explores the merit of condition C. If dividend mimicking is motivated by
information, rather than rivalry, this behavior should be more prevalent in environments with
higher information uncertainty (Lieberman and Asaba (2006)). In this section, we examine if
peer influence on dividends is more pronounced among firms with high information uncertainty.
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We use two variables as measures for information uncertainty: 1) industry average analyst
coverage, computed as the average monthly number of earnings forecasts a firm in the industry
receives over the fiscal year, and 2) industry average of the probability of informed trading
(PIN).19 We consider a firm to have a more [less] uncertain information environment if the
firm’s industry average PIN is higher [lower] than the median industry average PIN or if the
industry average number of analyst forecasts is below [above] the median.
Panel C of Table 6 presents the results of regressions estimated on subsamples of firms
with higher or lower information uncertainty. Using each measure, we find that the peer effect on
dividend is more pronounced among firms that operate in better information environments, i.e.,
firms in industries that are followed by more analysts and where stock trading conveys less
private information (lower PIN). We also find some evidence that peer effects in repurchases are
higher in better information environments, i.e., firms in industries that are followed by more
analysts. These findings do not suggest that peer influence in payouts is greater in more uncertain
environments and do not support the information-based theory of imitation.
Overall, these results do not provide strong support for traditional signaling theories of
dividend. While smaller, younger and harder-to-value firms exhibit mimicking behavior, which
is consistent with a signaling motive, larger, more established and easier-to-value firms do it too.
Moreover, we find no evidence that mimicking is more pronounced in the presence of higher
information uncertainty. This result contradicts the prediction of signaling theory that mimicking
should be more prevalent among firms for which the benefit of signaling should be larger due to
greater information asymmetry.20
19

Analysts are among the most important information producers in financial markets. A number
of prior studies show that financial analyst research is an important channel through which
information about a firm is revealed (see, e.g., Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Gleason
and Lee (2003), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), and Adhikari (2016)).
Thus, greater analyst following implies a better information environment. Similarly, a large
literature finds that PIN measures information asymmetry between firms and investors. For
example, a larger PIN reflects a poorer quality of financial disclosure (see, e.g., Brown and
Hillegeist (2007)). We use industry average analyst coverage and PIN because testing rivalrybased vs. information-based theories of mimicking requires a measure of the overall information
environment within an industry.
20
This finding parallels Leary and Michaely’s (2011) finding that dividend smoothing is more
prevalent in firms with lower information asymmetry.
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7. Additional analyses
This section presents the results of three tests that shed additional light on the causes and
consequences of peer influence in payouts.
7.1 Role of financial constraints
We expect peer influence on dividends to depend on financial constraints. Constraints on
dividend payouts imposed by financial troubles and difficulty in raising external capital to
finance investments should dominate the incentive to imitate peers’ payout. This should
especially be true with dividends, which conveys a stronger commitment by the firm to the
market, than repurchases. We use a firm’s credit rating by S&P as a measure of its financial
constraints following Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015), whose findings suggest that not
having a credit rating does a better job of identifying financial constraints compared to other
traditional measures of financial constraints.21
Panel D of Table 6 presents the results of regressions estimated on subsamples of firms
with and without a long-term credit rating from S&P. We find that the peer effect on dividend is
more pronounced among rated firms, which have better access to external capital. On the other
hand, peer influence in repurchases is virtually indistinguishable among rated and unrated firms.
The importance of financial constraint in dividend mimicking and its lack in repurchase
mimicking are consistent with the findings of Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) that
firms pay dividends out of their permanent cash flows but repurchases out of temporary cash
flows.

21

We stick to the absence of a credit rating as a measure of financial constraint for two reasons.
First, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) find that the five popular traditional proxies of
financial constraint (i.e., having a credit rating, paying dividends, and the indices of KaplanZingales, Whited-Wu, and Hadlock-Pierce) do not adequately predict a firm’s ability to raise
external capital. Their empirical findings suggest that having or not having a credit rating does a
somewhat better job of predicting financial constraint, even though it may proxy for the stage of
a firm’s life cycle. Second, the last three indices are linear combinations of a firm’s age, size and
leverage, some of which we have already used to partition the sample for size and age leaders
and followers.
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7.2 Trends in peer influence
We first examine how peer influence on dividends and repurchases has changed over
time. This analysis extends the analyses by Fama and French (2001a), who find that the
propensity to pay dividends has decreased over time and bottomed-out in the 1990s; DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), who find that the overall amount of dividends has actually
increased, but has become concentrated among larger and profitable firms; and Julio and
Ikenberry (2004), who argue that dividend initiations and increases have picked up in the early
2000s. We explore whether the trends in peer influence in payouts are consistent with the
intertemporal patterns in aggregate dividend payouts and repurchases found by previous studies.
We estimate our main regressions in subsamples of roughly a decade each: 1965 to 1979
(1970s), 1980 to 1989 (1980s), 1990 to 1999 (1990s), and 2000 to 2010 (2000s). The results of
payout using IV-Tobit regressions are presented in Table 7. In Panel A, we find an interesting
pattern: the magnitude of peer influence on dividends payout continues to increase until it peaks
in the 1990s and declines in the 2000s. Intriguingly, this pattern mirrors Grullon et. al.’s (2011)
finding that the proportion of dividend-paying firms bottomed out in the 1990s, then increased
slightly in the 2000s.
Panel B reports results of similar analyses of repurchases. Interestingly, the trend in peer
influence in share repurchases mirrors the trend in peer influence in dividends. Collectively, this
set of results is consistent with the studies of Skinner (2008) and Grullon and Michaely (2002),
who show a significant substitution from dividends to share repurchases.
7.3 Market reaction to dividend changes conditioned on proximity to peers
To dig deeper into firms’ incentives to follow peers’ dividends, we next examine
dividend announcement returns as a function of peers’ dividends. Specifically, we examine how
the market reacts to dividend change announcements by a firm, conditional on where the level of
its resulting dividend stacks up relative to its industry peers. To do so, we first calculate the
absolute difference between a firm’s dividend payout ratios and those of their peers’. Then based
on the median of such absolute differences, we partition the sample by whether a firm’s dividend
payout ratios are close to or far from its peers.
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Table 8 presents the regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns CAR (-1,+1)
around quarterly dividend announcements as a function of changes in firm-level dividend
payouts (Div/Assets) and whether the payout ratios are close to (Panel A: models 1, 3 and 5) or
far from (Panel A: models 2, 4 and 6) industry peers’. In Panel A, columns 1 and 2 show, as
expected, that the change in the dividend to assets ratio (∆Div/Assets) positively predicts the
market reaction to the change. The marginal effect of this change is slightly larger when the
resulting dividend is closer to peer averages (column 1) than when it is further away from them
(column 2), though the difference is statistically insignificant, as shown by the chi-squared test in
the last row of the panel.
These patterns become more interesting when we partition the samples further by
whether there was an increase (columns 3 and 4) or decrease (columns 4 and 5) in the firm-level
quarterly payout ratio. Columns 3 and 4 show that when a firm increases its dividend payout
ratio, the marginal effect of the change in the payout ratio on the market reaction is much higher
if the resulting dividend is closer to peers than when it is further away from them. The coefficient
on ∆Div/Assets in columns 3 and 4 is 1.645 and 0.674, respectively, and the difference between
them is statistically significant at the 1% level. A potential explanation of this difference is that
the market considers an increase in dividends to be more sustainable when the resulting payout
ratio is closer to its peers’ and reacts more positively. In the subsample of firm-quarters with
decreases in Div/Assets, the marginal effect of ∆Div/Assets also positively predicts the market
reaction to the change, i.e., larger decreases in dividends lead to larger drops in stock prices. But
there is no statistical difference in the market reaction between subsamples where the resulting
dividend payout ratio is closer to peers and where it is further away from peers. One possible
reason for this asymmetry is that dividend increases are largely voluntary, so investors pay more
attention to whether dividend payout is on par with peers. On the other hand, dividend decreases
are more likely to be imposed by financial constraints, so being close to peers is less important.
One issue with the analysis relates to time variation in the premium that investors place
on dividends. Specifically, firms may increase dividends and try to catch up with industry peers’
dividend payouts during years with high dividend premiums. If so, our results in columns (3) and
(4) of Panel A may be entirely driven by a more positive market reaction during higher dividend
premium years, regardless of whether a firm mimics its peers or not. To address this issue, in
29

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064848

Panel B, we repeat this analysis of dividend increases in the subsamples of high and low
dividend premium years, as defined in Panel D of Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) [(3) and (4)] are
subsamples of high [low] dividend premium years and dividend increases. Consistent with Li
and Lie (2006), the coefficient estimates of dividend change in columns (1) and (2) are higher
than those in (3) and (4), respectively, which suggests that the market reaction to dividend
increases is more positive in high dividend premium years. However, importantly, within high
(low) dividend premium years, the coefficient on ∆Div/Assets is significantly larger when the
resulting dividend payout is closer to peers than when it is farther away from peers [see columns
(1) vs. (2) ((3) vs. (4))]. As shows by the Chi2-test, these differences in coefficients are also
statistically significant. Therefore, it appears that the market views dividend increases more
positively if the resulting dividend comes closer to peers, regardless of a general market-wide
preference for dividends.
7.4 Do peer effects increase over time following dividend initiation?
Dividends tend to be sticky. Therefore, one interesting question is whether a firm starts
following its peers right from the time it initiates a dividend or whether its dividend tends to
gradually converge to its peers’. We conjecture that because dividends are quasi-irreversible
decisions, firm converge to peer averages gradually, once they are sure that they will be able to
keep up with their peers.
We identify the subsample of dividend-paying firms which initiated dividends during our
sample period, and analyze their payout ratios after the initiation. Because of these restrictions,
the sample size reduces substantially. Our main explanatory variable of interest is the interaction
of peer averages of the dividend payout ratio (Peer Div/Assets) and the number of years since the
firm’s dividend initiation (YearsSinceInitiation).
Table 9 presents the results in both OLS and 2SLS settings. Column 1 shows the
regression using OLS. The control variables (not tabulated) are the same as in the baseline
regressions in Table 5. We find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the
peer dividend ratio and years since initiation. The main effect of the peer dividend payout ratio is
positive, but statistically insignificant. Column 2 shows estimates of the second-stage of the
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2SLS regression. The endogenous explanatory variable in the first stage is the peer average of
the dividend payout ratio and its interaction with YearsSinceInitiation. The instruments we use
are our two earlier instruments [Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity
Risk)] and their interactions with YearsSinceInitiation. This model also obtains a positive and
statistically significant coefficient on the instrumented interaction of years since dividend
initiation and peer dividend ratio. These results suggest that a firm’s dividend payout ratio starts
to move toward its peer averages gradually over time following dividend initiation.

8. Conclusion
The question of why firms pay dividends has always baffled financial economists. Many
firms routinely pay dividends even though it may be an inefficient way to distribute cash to
stockholders. Even more puzzling, some firms pay dividends even when they don’t have excess
cash and have to borrow in order to pay dividends. This paper provides one explanation of these
phenomena, namely peer pressure. Our cross-sectional tests show that peer influence on
dividends is consistent with the rivalry-based theory of imitation. Peer influence is greater among
firms that face more intense product market competition and operate in better information
environments. And firms, especially younger and smaller firms, follow peers that are similar to
them in size and age. We find parallel and largely consistent results for stock repurchases.
Moreover, the ability to repurchase shares enables firms to deflect peer pressure to initiate
dividends, but share repurchases do not significantly affect peer pressure on the amount of
dividend subsequent to dividend initiation.
Our findings have several implications for research in finance. For instance, if industry
peers significantly affect corporate policies, managers may not have as much discretion in setting
firm policies as the research on managerial behavior suggests. From an asset-pricing standpoint,
if firms deviate from their fundamentals and mimic their industry peers in paying dividends, our
findings question the soundness of dividend discount models of equity valuation. From an
estimation standpoint, the presence of significant correlations between dividend payouts across
firms in an industry suggests the need for clustering of standard errors at the industry level in
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firm-level dividend analyses. Broadly, this work contributes to a growing literature that
investigates whether firms are influenced by their peers when making their financial decisions.
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Appendix: Variable definitions
The following table describes the main variables used in the paper. The peer average variable X for
any firm i in year t is defined as the average X across all firms, except firm i, that share the same
three-digit SIC code in year t.
Variable

Definition

Dividend Payer

An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays a cash dividend in a given fiscal year,
and 0 otherwise. From CSRP

Dividend Initiation

An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend in the current year but did
not pay dividends last year, and 0 otherwise. From CRSP

Repurchaser

An indicator variables that equals 1 if a firm repurchases its stock (PRSTKC>0) in a
given year, 0 otherwise: From Compustat

Div/Assets

Cash dividend divided by total assets (AT). From CSRP and Compustat

Repur/Assets

Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock PRSTKC/AT. From Compustat

Total Payout

Div/Assets + Repur/Assets

Sales Growth

Annual change in log of sales. From Compustat

Mkt. to Book

(Market Value of Assets/Book Value of Assets) =
(PRCC_F*CSHPRI+DLC+DLTT+PSTKL-TXDITC)/AT. From Compustat

R&D/Assets

R&D Expenditure/Book Value of Assets = max(0,XRD)/AT. From Compustat

Log Firm Age

Log(current fiscal year – fiscal year of first appearance in Compustat). From Compustat

Size (NYSE %ile)

Fraction of New York Stock Exchange firms with market capitalization less than or
equal to a given firm in a year

RE/BE

Retained Earnings/Common Equity = RE/CEQ. From Compustat

Profitability

Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by total assets. From Compustat

Book Leverage

(Debt in Current Liabilities + Long Term Debt)/Assets = (DLC+DLTT)/AT

Cash Flow Risk

Standard deviation of cash flow to assets ratio for up to previous 10 years. Cash flow to
assets ratio= (IB+DP-DV)/AT. From Compustat

Idios. Equity Shock Residuals obtained from regressions of monthly stock returns over a year on estimated
loadings on Fama-French and Carhart factors and industry average excess returns,
compounded each year. From CRSP
Idios. Equity Risk

Log of the standard deviation of residuals obtained from the above model. From CRSP
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Table 1: Factor regression summary
The sample consists of monthly returns of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the CRSPCompustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. This table presents the summary statistics of
estimated parameters of factors obtained from the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) fourfactor model, augmented with industry average excess returns as follows:

where
refers to the total return for the firm i in industry j over the month t.
is the
is the size factor,
is the book-to-market factor,
is the
excess market return,
momentum factor, and
is the excess return on an equally weighted industry (threedigit SIC codes) portfolio excluding firm i's return.
∝

Obs Per Regression
R2
Monthly Return
Expected Monthly Return
Idiosyncratic Monthly Return

Mean Median
0.007
0.005
0.945
0.922
0.903
0.726
0.138
0.172
-0.109 -0.081
-0.049
0.092
54
60
0.307
0.288
0.014
0.000
0.013
0.013
0.001 -0.008

S.D.
0.062
0.792
1.271
1.306
0.884
3.651
11
0.166
0.177
0.191
0.243
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Table 2: Relevance of the instrumental variables for dividends
The table shows estimates from regression models in which peer average idiosyncratic equity shocks (Peer Idios.
Equity Shock) and idiosyncratic volatilities (Peer Idios. Equity Risk) predict peers’ average future profitability and
cash flow risks. The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged
database from 1965 to 2010. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in
a given year. The models include year and firm fixed-effects. The Appendix provides detailed definition of all these
variables. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%.
The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
Peer
Profitabilityt+1
Peer Idios. Equity Shock
Peer Idios. Equity Risk
Peer Profitability
Peer Sales Growth
Peer Mkt. to Book
Peer Log(Firm Age)
Peer Size (NYSE %ile)
Peer RE/BE
Peer Cash Flow Risk
Peer R&D/Assets
Constant
N
Adj. R2

(2)
Peer
Profitabilityt+2

(3)
Peer
Profitabilityt+3

(4)
Peer Cash Flow
Risk(t+1, t+5)

0.022***
(30.97)
-0.022***
(-15.55)
0.302***
(27.49)
0.022***
(8.95)
-0.005***
(-6.01)
0.011***
(4.61)
0.001***
(12.84)
-0.001*
(-1.65)
0.194***
(16.31)
-0.646***
(-17.49)
-0.033***
(-2.66)

0.012***
(13.90)
-0.014***
(-8.99)
0.146***
(17.61)
0.011***
(4.24)
-0.012***
(-13.13)
0.017***
(5.62)
0.001***
(7.45)
-0.000
(-1.13)
0.161***
(11.91)
-0.685***
(-15.91)
-0.003
(-0.21)

0.010***
(10.75)
-0.010***
(-5.28)
0.075***
(8.66)
0.001
(0.28)
-0.013***
(-13.17)
0.015***
(4.81)
0.000***
(4.15)
0.000
(0.78)
0.082***
(5.05)
-0.777***
(-16.16)
0.009
(0.53)

-0.008***
(-6.12)
0.018***
(8.40)
-0.086***
(-9.67)
0.006*
(1.74)
0.005***
(4.80)
-0.011***
(-3.87)
-0.000
(-0.24)
0.001**
(2.45)
-0.063***
(-4.91)
0.454***
(18.91)
0.180***
(13.07)

98270
0.333

88813
0.230

80539
0.203

18323
0.366
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Table 3: Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in our main analyses. The sample consists of all
nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. The final sample
includes about 98,270 firm years, except for dividend initiation which only includes the prior year’s dividend nonpayers. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in a given year. The
Appendix provides detailed definitions of these variables. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous
variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%.

Firm Specific Factors
Dividend Payer
Repurchaser
Div. Initiation
Div/Assets
Repur/Assets
Total Payout
Sales Growth
Mkt. to Book
R&D/Assets
Log(Firm Age)
RE/BE
Size (NYSE %ile)
Profitability
Cash Flow Risk
Idios. Equity Shock
Idios. Equity Risk
Peer Firm Averages
Peer Div. Payers
Peer Repurchasers
Peer Div/Assets
Peer Repur/Assets
Peer Total Payout
Peer Sales Growth
Peer Mkt. to Book
Peer R&D/Assets
Peer Log(Firm Age)
Peer RE/BE
Peer Size (NYSE %ile)
Peer Profitability
Peer Cash Flow Risk
Peer Idios. Equity Shock
Peer Idios. Equity Risk

Mean

S.D.

P25

Median

P75

0.466
0.354
0.035
0.010
0.012
0.022
0.087
1.373
0.035
2.686
-0.04
24.814
0.105
0.068
-0.04
0.132

0.499
0.478
0.183
0.016
0.035
0.040
0.28
1.277
0.079
0.625
3.71
29.231
0.16
0.096
0.702
0.084

0
0
0
-0.013
0.687
0
2.197
0.125
1
0.068
0.019
-0.464
0.076

0
0
0.008
0.085
0.972
0
2.708
0.568
11
0.127
0.034
-0.083
0.109

0.016
0.004
0.027
0.187
1.542
0.035
3.178
0.809
44
0.184
0.072
0.261
0.161

0.435
0.340
0.009
0.011
0.020
0.077
1.42
0.037
2.759
-0.155
23.12
0.087
0.07
-0.028
0.14

0.282
0.187
0.008
0.012
0.013
0.117
0.762
0.056
0.34
1.365
14.483
0.1
0.056
0.258
0.049

0.176

0.4

0.667

0.003
0.003
0.012
0.02
0.9
0.001
2.526
-0.584
13.369
0.055
0.03
-0.176
0.104

0.007
0.008
0.017
0.084
1.222
0.01
2.739
0.33
19.533
0.111
0.05
-0.04
0.131

0.014
0.015
0.025
0.141
1.695
0.051
2.979
0.626
29.2
0.149
0.093
0.106
0.166
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Table 4: Propensity to pay dividends or to repurchase
The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. The Appendix provides detailed
definitions of all the variables. Columns 1 and 6 show estimates from the first-stage of instrumental variables models, in which the dependent variable is the
fraction of peers that pay dividends (Peer Div. Payers) and fraction of peers who repurchase shares (Peer Repurchasers), respectively. In both columns 1 and 6,
the instruments are Lag1(Peer Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk). Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a
firm in a given year. The dependent variable in column 2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm pays a cash dividend in a given year. In columns 3, 4
and 5, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether a firm starts paying dividends. Columns 3, 4 and 5 use the sample of last year’s non-dividend
payers only. In columns 7, 8 and 9, the dependent variable is whether a firm repurchases shares. All the models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are
robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are
winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
Peer Div.
Payers

(2)
Dividend
Payer

(IV Probit:
1st Stage)
Peer firm averages
Instrumented Peer Div.
Payers

(IV-Probit:
2nd Stage)

(3)
Dividend
Initiation
(IV-Probit:
2nd Stage:
Full Sample)

(4)
Dividend
Initiation
(IV-Probit: 2nd
Stage: NonRepurchasers)

1.090***
(6.65)

0.532**
(2.43)

0.926***
(3.22)

(5)
Dividend
Initiation
(IV-Probit: 2nd
Stage:
Repurchasers)

(6)
Peer
Repurchasers
(IV Probit: 1st
Stage)

Peer Mkt. to Book
Peer Log(Firm Age)
Peer Size (NYSE %ile)
Peer RE/BE

-0.042***
(-6.72)
0.013***
(6.84)
0.204***
(30.29)
0.002***
(16.62)
0.004***
(4.06)

-0.125*
(-1.94)
0.075***
(2.84)
0.163**
(2.26)
-0.007***
(-4.83)
0.010
(1.30)

0.192
(1.60)
0.000
(0.01)
0.083
(1.02)
-0.002
(-1.44)
-0.017
(-1.62)

(8)
Repurchaser

(9)
Repurchaser

(IV-Probit:
2nd Stage:
Full Sample)

IV-Probit: 2nd
Stage: NonDiv. Payers)

(IV-Probit:
2nd Stage:
Div. Payers)

0.881***
(3.50)
-0.005
(-0.11)
0.005
(0.33)
-0.128***
(-3.66)
-0.004***
(-4.08)
-0.006
(-1.08)

0.643**
(1.96)
-0.039
(-0.62)
-0.031*
(-1.68)
-0.189***
(-4.49)
-0.001
(-1.01)
-0.007
(-1.07)

-0.041
(-0.12)

Instrumented Peer
Repurchasers
Peer Sales Growth

(7)
Repurchaser

0.281*
(1.80)
0.010
(0.25)
0.022
(0.20)
-0.004**
(-2.16)
-0.029**
(-1.99)

0.112
(0.58)
-0.001
(-0.03)
0.216*
(1.67)
0.000
(0.10)
-0.004
(-0.28)
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-0.060***
(-8.94)
-0.000
(-0.25)
-0.002
(-0.43)
0.001***
(4.09)
0.003***
(3.54)

1.020**
(2.56)
0.066
(0.80)
0.056**
(1.96)
-0.104*
(-1.85)
-0.005***
(-3.93)
-0.005
(-0.60)

Peer Profitability
Peer Cash Flow Risk
Peer R&D/Assets
Firm-specific factors
Sales Growth
Mkt. to Book
R&D/Assets
Log(Firm Age)
Size (NYSE %ile)
RE/BE
Profitability
Cash Flow Risk
Idios. Equity Shock
Idios. Equity Risk

0.047***
(2.74)
-0.362***
(-10.24)
-0.299***
(-8.99)

-0.621***
(-2.90)
-0.300
(-0.76)
-0.500
(-0.88)

-0.345
(-1.41)
0.073
(0.16)
0.053
(0.10)

-0.616*
(-1.94)
0.362
(0.58)
0.270
(0.39)

0.030
(0.08)
-0.618
(-0.93)
0.057
(0.07)

0.331***
(19.83)
0.264***
(8.66)
-0.244***
(-7.91)

0.040
(0.26)
0.696***
(2.91)
-0.113
(-0.39)

0.063
(0.36)
1.089***
(3.74)
-0.235
(-0.75)

0.080
(0.27)
0.396
(0.98)
0.247
(0.42)

-0.002
(-1.10)
0.001
(1.10)
-0.020
(-1.55)
0.010***
(4.56)
0.000
(0.97)
-0.000***
(-3.62)
-0.015**
(-2.40)
-0.002
(-0.17)
0.001
(1.46)
-0.017***
(-9.39)

-0.330***
(-9.56)
-0.135***
(-7.11)
-1.754***
(-3.09)
0.547***
(20.20)
0.058***
(7.62)
0.012***
(15.77)
4.550***
(26.25)
-4.594***
(-9.42)
0.063***
(7.64)
-0.909***
(-37.43)

-0.086
(-1.59)
-0.129***
(-6.06)
-1.699***
(-3.42)
0.149***
(5.92)
0.007
(1.34)
0.004***
(5.02)
2.990***
(16.77)
-0.614***
(-2.66)
0.130***
(8.66)
-0.319***
(-10.45)

-0.071
(-1.05)
-0.152***
(-5.02)
-1.960***
(-2.76)
0.184***
(5.67)
0.019***
(2.81)
0.004***
(4.61)
3.198***
(13.64)
-0.625**
(-2.01)
0.154***
(8.06)
-0.363***
(-9.32)

-0.078
(-0.84)
-0.092***
(-3.10)
-1.450**
(-2.18)
0.099**
(2.53)
-0.009
(-1.35)
0.002**
(2.24)
2.536***
(9.29)
-0.541
(-1.56)
0.097***
(4.00)
-0.213***
(-4.13)

-0.002
(-1.40)
-0.000
(-0.55)
0.008
(0.75)
-0.003*
(-1.89)
-0.000
(-1.06)
-0.000***
(-4.31)
0.029***
(5.34)
0.012
(1.43)
-0.001
(-1.20)
-0.010***
(-5.64)

-0.211***
(-10.25)
-0.015*
(-1.81)
-0.100
(-0.62)
0.054***
(3.40)
0.010***
(4.67)
0.004***
(9.39)
1.302***
(17.44)
-0.637***
(-6.09)
-0.002
(-0.27)
-0.347***
(-21.25)

-0.151***
(-6.80)
-0.018**
(-2.01)
-0.160
(-0.98)
-0.010
(-0.51)
0.007***
(3.40)
0.005***
(8.59)
1.168***
(15.06)
-0.435***
(-4.15)
-0.009
(-1.12)
-0.345***
(-17.56)

-0.425***
(-8.98)
-0.044**
(-2.32)
0.025
(0.05)
0.066**
(2.44)
0.046***
(3.94)
0.003***
(4.97)
1.573***
(8.43)
-0.770**
(-2.19)
0.023*
(1.84)
-0.253***
(-9.70)
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Instrumental Variables
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity
Shock)
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity
Risk)
N
Wald test of exogeneity
(chi2)
F-test for the instruments

0.030***
(12.25)

-0.008***
(-2.91)

-0.316***
(-50.21)

-0.134***
(-23.78)

98270

98270
6.14**

52413
0.30

37231

15182

2.94*

94728
1.43

1268.8***

3.21*
128.33***
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94728

51642
0.62

43086
2.34

Table 5: The amount of payout
The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965
to 2010. The Appendix provides detailed definitions of the variables. The dependent variables are total cash
dividend paid in a year (Div/Assets) or the amount of repurchases (Repur/Assets) scaled by total assets, or the sum of
the two ratios (Total Payout)). Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm
in a given year. In Panel A, columns 1 and 2 show the first and second stage estimates, respectively, from an IVTobit regression with Div/Assets as the main dependent variable. Column 3 and 4 show the first and second stages
of an instrumental variables Tobit (IV-Tobit) regression with Peer Repur/Assets as the main dependent variable.
Column 5 shows the estimate from the second stage of an IV-Tobit regression with Total Payout as the main
dependent variable (the first stage is not tabulated). The instruments in all the regressions are Lag1(Peer Idios.
Equity Shock) and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk). Panel B shows estimates from the second stage of two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regressions in the subsamples of dividend-paying firm-years (column 1) and repurchasing firm-years
(column 2) only. The models are estimated using the full set of control variables, which are not tabulated. Columns
1 and 2 show estimates from regressions of Div/Assets and Repur/Assets ratio, respectively, of a firm on the
instrumented peer averages of the respective ratio. All the models include year fixed-effects. In Panel C, columns 1
and 2 of show the second stages of IV-Tobit regressions of Div/Assets using the subsamples of last year’s nonrepurchasers (column 1) and repurchasers (column 2) only. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 show the second stages of
IV-Tobit regressions of Repur/Assets using the subsamples of last year’s non-dividend payers (column 3) and
dividend payers (column 4) only. In Panel D, columns 1 and 2 show the second stages of IV-Tobit regressions of
Div/Assets using the subsamples of firm-years with low dividend premium (column 1) and high dividend premium
(column 2), based on the time-series median of annual value-weighted dividend premiums; columns 5 and 6 show
similar regressions of Repur/Assets. Column 3 [7] presents the second stage of a two-stage least squares regression
of Div/Assets [Repur/Assets], which controls for year x industry fixed effects, where industry is defined by FamaFrench 48 classification. Column 4 [8] presents the second stage of a 2SLS firm-fixed effects regression of
Div/Assets [Repur/Assets]. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence (industry
clustering in Panel D, columns 4 and 8), and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all
continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Payout in full sample (payers and non-payers)
(1)
Peer
Div/Assets
(IV-Tobit –
1st Stage)
Peer Firm Averages
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets

(2)
Div/Assets
(IV-Tobit – 2nd
Stage)

(3)
Peer
Repur/Assets
(IV-Tobit –
1st Stage)

(4)
Repur/Assets
(IV-Tobit –
2nd Stage)

(5)
Total
Payout
(IV-Tobit –
2nd Stage)

0.580***
(6.84)

Instrumented Peer
Repur/Assets

1.659***
(3.98)

Instrumented Peer Total
Payout
Peer Sales Growth

-0.006***
(-23.70)

0.002
(1.38)

-0.005***
(-13.67)

0.006
(1.60)

0.806***
(8.30)
0.004**
(2.01)

Peer Mkt. to Book

0.003***

0.000

0.002***

-0.004***

-0.003***
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Peer Log(Firm Age)
Peer Size (NYSE %ile)
Peer RE/BE
Peer Profitability
Peer Cash Flow Risk
Peer R&D/Assets
Firm-specific factors
Sales Growth
Mkt. to Book
R&D/Assets
Log(Firm Age)
Size (NYSE %ile)
RE/BE
Profitability
Cash Flow Risk
Lag1(Idios. Equity Shock)
Lag1(Idios. Equity Risk)
Instrumental Variables
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock)
Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk)
N
R2 (Pseudo R2)
Test of Weak Instruments
(chi2)
Wald test of exogeneity (chi2)

(28.57)
0.005***
(21.49)
0.000***
(11.01)
-0.000**
(-1.97)
0.016***
(20.36)
0.009***
(6.55)
-0.006***
(-4.76)

(0.72)
0.004***
(3.64)
-0.000***
(-7.14)
0.000**
(2.47)
-0.022***
(-5.45)
-0.011*
(-1.68)
-0.010
(-0.97)

(13.75)
-0.003***
(-11.04)
0.000***
(6.08)
0.000
(1.37)
0.033***
(32.19)
0.024***
(11.78)
0.013***
(6.88)

(-3.44)
-0.004*
(-1.73)
-0.000***
(-5.22)
-0.001*
(-1.68)
-0.029*
(-1.86)
0.019
(1.21)
-0.010
(-0.58)

(-4.47)
-0.002
(-1.29)
-0.000***
(-7.94)
-0.000
(-1.61)
-0.033***
(-4.45)
0.015
(1.41)
-0.013
(-0.97)

-0.000***
(-4.23)
0.000
(1.59)
-0.000
(-0.88)
0.000***
(3.59)
-0.000
(-1.12)
-0.000***
(-3.56)
0.000
(0.81)
0.001**
(2.12)
0.000
(1.01)
-0.001***
(-9.32)

-0.014***
(-21.63)
0.002***
(5.74)
-0.032***
(-3.28)
0.009***
(21.17)
0.001***
(8.86)
0.000***
(8.70)
0.107***
(33.16)
-0.061***
(-8.14)
0.000***
(2.96)
-0.015***
(-33.43)

-0.000***
(-2.82)
0.000
(1.20)
0.001**
(1.98)
-0.000***
(-2.58)
-0.000
(-1.26)
-0.000***
(-4.14)
0.002***
(6.88)
0.001*
(1.71)
-0.000**
(-2.41)
-0.000***
(-4.11)

-0.021***
(-14.78)
0.004***
(6.64)
0.002
(0.15)
0.000
(0.28)
0.001***
(4.37)
0.000***
(10.95)
0.104***
(19.44)
-0.019***
(-2.81)
-0.000
(-0.10)
-0.017***
(-18.45)

-0.022***
(-19.61)
0.006***
(11.10)
0.017*
(1.83)
0.006***
(9.82)
0.001***
(4.41)
0.000***
(17.73)
0.130***
(27.55)
-0.028***
(-4.40)
0.000
(1.02)
-0.023***
(-34.53)

98270

-0.001***
(-4.77)
-0.004***
(-13.93)
98270

98270

98270

7.42***

16.55***

0.0003***
(3.77)
-0.009***
(-37.93)
98270

1514.27***

256.92***
2.51
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Panel B: Dividend (repurchase) mimicking by dividend payers (repurchasers) only
Div/Assets
(2SLS – 2nd Stage)
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets

Repur/Assets
(2SLS – 2nd Stage))

0.516***
(5.87)

Instrumented Peer Repur/Assets

0.623**
(2.44)

N
Adj. R2
Under-identification Test
Hansen J (p-value)

45761
0.382
539.35***
0.855

35110
0.171
161.75***
0.801

Panel C: Dividends (repurchases) partitioned by the presence of repurchases (dividends)
(1)
Div/Assets
(Non-Repurchasers)
Peer Firm Averages
Instrumented Peer
Div/Assets

0.541***
(5.49)

(2)
Div/Assets
(Repurchasers)

(4)
Repur/Assets
(Dividend payers)

1.569***
(2.96)
52413

2.074***
(3.03)
45857

0.597***
(5.08)

Instrumented Peer
Repur/Assets
N

(3)
Repur/Assets
(Dividend non-payers)

64026

34244

Panel D: Effect of dividend premium and firm heterogeneity in mimicking payouts
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Div/Assets
(Low Div
Premium)
Peer Firm Averages
Instrumented Peer
Div/Assets

0.729***
(6.11)

Div/Assets
(High Div
Premium)

0.415***
(4.83)

Div/
Assets
(Firm
FE)

Div/Assets
(Ind*Year
Control)

0.263***
(4.29)

1.508***
(4.24)
60361

37909

97136

Repur/
Assets
(High Div
Premium)

(8)

Repur/
Assets
(Ind*Year
Control)

Repur/
Assets
(Firm FE)

0.191**
(2.22)

Instrumented Peer
Repur/Assets
Firm Fixed Effects
N

Repur/
Assets
(Low Div
Premium)

(7)

Yes
97315

60361

1.442
(1.03)
37909
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0.644**
(2.51)
97136

0.789***
(2.92)
Yes
97315

Table 6: Heterogeneity in peer influence
The table shows estimates from the second stage of instrumental variable Tobit regressions of Div/Assets or
Repur/Assets on various subsamples. The models are estimated using the full set of control variables, which are not
tabulated. In each regression, the peer average dividend ratio and the instrumental variables are calculated within the
relevant subsample. Panel A shows regressions for subsamples of firms facing high or low product market
competition, measured using Hoberg and Phillips’ (2016) total similarity measure. The sample of firm-years with
above [below] median similarity measure within a year is defined as that with high [low] product market
competition. The sample period is from 1994 to 2010. Panel B presents regressions for subsamples of smaller,
larger, younger, older, more tangible or less tangible firms, partitioned based on the median market capitalization,
firm age or asset tangibility. The sample period here is from 1965 to 2010. Panel C shows regressions in subsamples
of firms with above- or below-median number of industry average analyst coverage or industry average probability
of informed trading (PIN). The sample period here is from 1993 to 2010 (1990 to 2010) for sample partitions based
on PIN (number of analysts following). Panel D shows regressions in subsamples of firms with or without a longterm credit rating by S&P. All models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and
within firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables
are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Panel A: Product market competition and payout mimicking
(1)
(2)
Div/Assets
Div/Assets
(High Product
(Low Product
Competition)
Competition)
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets
1.289***
0.698***
(2.62)
(3.75)
Instrumented Repur/Assets
N

16925

19245

(3)
Repur/Assets
(High Product
Competition)

(4)
Repur/Assets
(Low Product
Competition)

1.264**
(2.27)
16925

0.979***
(2.79)
19245

Panel B: Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility

Small Peers’
Instrumented Div/Assets

Smaller Firms
(1)
(2)
Div/Assets Div/Assets

Larger Firms
(3)
(4)
Div/Assets Div/Assets

0.552*
(1.88)

0.021
(0.94)

Large Peers’
Instrumented Div/Assets

0.168***
(2.76)

Younger Firms
(5)
(6)
Div/Assets Div/Assets

Older Firms
(7)
(8)
Div/Assets Div/Assets

0.409***
(2.88)

0.099**
(2.15)

0.287***
(5.51)

Younger Peers’
Instrumented Div/Assets
Older Peers’
Instrumented Div/Assets
N

29017

27897

31453

34559

19571

0.077
(1.29)
19940
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35910

0.250***
(5.31)
36564

Panel B (cont.): Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility

Less Tangible Peers’
Instrumented Div/Assets

Less Tangible Firms
(9)
(10)
Div/Assets
Div/Assets

More Tangible Firms
(11)
(12)
Div/Assets
Div/Assets

0.230*

-0.035

(1.96)

(-0.90)

More Tangible Peers’
Instrumented Div/Assets
N

29813

0.165***

0.331***

(3.10)

(4.93)

26806

26177

31703

Panel B (cont.): Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility

Small Peers’
Instrumented
Repur/Assets

Smaller Firms
(13)
(14)
Repur/Assets Repur/Assets

Larger Firms
(15)
(16)
Repur/Assets Repur/Assets

0.071
(0.06)

0.405***
(2.98)

Large Peers’
Instrumented
Repur/Assets

0.004
(0.03)

Younger Firms
(17)
(18)
Repur/Assets Repur/Assets

Older Firms
(19)
(20)
Repur/Assets Repur/Assets

0.292
(0.41)

0.259
(0.73)

1.260***
(6.12)

Younger Peers’
Instrumented
Repur/Assets
Older Peers’
Instrumented
Repur/Assets
N

29017

27897

31453

34559

19571

0.236
(1.10)
19940

35910

Panel B (cont.): Payout followers and leaders based on size, age and asset tangibility

Less Tangible Peers’
Instrumented Repur/Assets

Less Tangible Firms
(21)
(22)
Repur/Assets Repur/Assets

More Tangible Firms
(23)
(24)
Repur/Assets Repur/Assets

-0.486
(-0.76)

0.226
(1.21)

More Tangible Peers’
Instrumented Repur/Assets
N

29813

0.645
(0.36)
26806

26177

0.693**
(2.30)
31703
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0.889***
(3.75)
36564

Panel C: Information environment and peer influence
Industry average
Prob. of Informed Trading (PIN)
Low
High
(1)
(2)
Div/Assets
Div/Assets
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets
N

0.859***
(4.69)
23931

0.474*
(1.66)
24639

Industry average
Analyst Coverage
Low
High
(3)
(4)
Div/Assets
Div/Assets
0.494***
(2.59)
28318

0.940***
(4.09)
27934

Panel C (cont.): Information environment and peer influence
Industry average
Industry average
Prob. of Informed Trading (PIN)
Analyst Coverage
Low
High
Low
High
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Repur/Assets
Repur/Assets
Repur/Assets
Repur/Assets
Instrumented Peer Repur/Assets
N

1.308***
(3.60)
23931

1.585**
(2.34)
24639

0.804
(1.01)
28318

1.506***
(5.20)
27934

(2)
Div/Assets

(3)
Repur/Assets

(4)
Repur/Assets

(Unrated)
0.619***
(3.65)

(Credit Rated)

(Unrated)

Panel D: Financial constraints and payout mimicking

Instrumented Peer Div/Assets

(1)
Div/Assets
(Credit
Rated)
0.988***
(5.94)

Instrumented Repur/Assets
N

16795

48672

1.577***
(3.18)
16795

1.632***
(3.53)
48672
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Table 7: Trends in peer influence on payout
The sample consists of all nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965
to 2010. The appendix provides detailed definitions of the variables. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are estimates using
subsamples of data, respectively, from 1965 to 1979 (1970s), from 1980 to 1989 (1980s), from 1990 to 1999
(1990s), and from 2000 to 2010 (2000s). The dependent variables in Panels A and B, respectively, are total cash
dividend paid in a year divided by total assets and repurchase dollars divided by total assets. Peer firms are defined
as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in a given year. All estimates are from the second
stage of instrumental variables Tobit (IV-Tobit) regressions. The instruments are Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Shock)
and Lag1(Peer Idios. Equity Risk). The models are estimated using a full set of control variables, which are not
tabulated. All models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm
dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are
winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
IV-Tobit – 2nd Stage
(1)
1970s

(2)
1980s

(3)
1990s

(4)
2000s

Panel A: Div/Assets
Instrumented Peer Div/Assets
N

0.180

0.471*** 1.012*** 0.651***

(1.42)

(3.85)

19119

(5.45)

(2.98)

23637
27093
28421
Panel B: Repur/Assets

Instrumented Peer Repur/Assets 2.972

0.997

1.944** 1.048***

(1.55)

(0.80)

(2.14)

(3.24)

19119

23637

27093

28421

N
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Table 8: Announcement effect of quarterly dividend changes and proximity to peer averages
This table presents regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over three days surrounding quarterly dividend
announcements (CAR(-1, +1)). The sample consists of all cash dividend paying nonfinancial, nonutility firms in the
annual CRSP-Compustat merged database from 1965 to 2010. Estimates in this table are aimed at examining how
the market reacts to corporate dividend changes conditional on where the resulting dividend stacks up relative to
industry peer dividends. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in the three-digit SIC industry code of a firm in a
given year-quarter. The main explanatory variable of interest is the change in total quarterly cash dividends to assets
ratio (∆Div/Assets). To construct the sub-samples in columns 1 and 2, we first calculate the absolute difference
between the dividend payout ratio (Div/Assets) of a firm and the average ratio for its peers. Then based on the
median of such absolute difference, we partition the sample by whether a firm’s dividend payout ratio is close to its
peers (column 1) or far from them (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 are for the sub-samples of firms which experienced
an increase in Div/Assets in a given quarter and have dividend payout ratios close to peers (column 3) and far from
peers (column 4). Samples in columns 5 and 6 are analogous to those in 3 and 4, except that these are within the
subsample of firms which experienced a decrease in Div/Assets in a quarter. All models include year and quarter
fixed-effects. In Panel B, we partition the subsamples of dividend increases by double sorting on whether the
resulting dividend is close to or far from peers (defined above) and high/low dividend premium years (defined in
Table 5, Panel D). All models include quarter fixed effects. The t- or z-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and
within-firm dependence, and are shown in parentheses. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables
are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. The last row in each panel shows the Chi-squared test statistic for the difference in the
coefficient of ∆Div/Assets between columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6).
Panel A: Samples partitioned by the proximity of dividends to peers and the sign of quarterly Div/Assets changes

Intercept
∆Div/Assets
Div/Assets
Peer Div/Assets

(1)

(2)
Far from
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.0096

(3)
Div Increase
&
Close to
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.0072

(4)
Div Increase
&
Far from
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.0109

Close to
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.002

(5)
Div Decrease
&
Close to Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
-0.0036

(6)
Div Decrease
&
Far from
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.0108*

(0.17)

(1.27)

(0.74)

(1.21)

(-0.11)

(1.66)

0.9478***

0.8727***

1.645***

0.6737***

0.2816*

0.3848**

(8.37)

(9.08)

(6.36)

(4.59)

(1.9)

(2.59)

0.2839***

0.0635***

0.1709

0.0913**

0.3059*

0.0111

(3.23)

(2.64)

(1.18)

(2.2)

(1.8)

(0.25)

-0.0899

-0.0072

-0.1592

0.0195

-0.1287

-0.0123

(-0.9)

(-0.21)

(-0.99)

(0.36)

(-0.66)

(-0.2)

-0.0001*

-0.0003***

-0.0003**

-0.0007***

-0.0003**

-0.0004**

(-1.68)

(-4.05)

(-2.47)

(-4.84)

(-2.3)

(-2.35)

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quarter FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

79340

73904

31088

29670

22839

21317

Firm Size

N
Chi2-test of diff
in coeffs.

0.30

11.53***
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0.25

Panel B: Sample of Quarterly Div/Assets Increases partitioned by proximity of resulting dividend to peers and size
of the Dividend Premium
(1)
High Div
Premium
Years &
Close to
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
2.4861***

(2)
High Div
Premium
Years &
Far from
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.8637***

(3)
Low Div
Premium
Years &
Close to
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
1.2387***

(4)
Low Div
Premium
Years &
Far from
Peers
CAR(-1,+1)
0.6045***

(6.85)

(4.04)

(3.46)

(3.23)

Other controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quarter FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

14,648
12,260
15.41***

16,440

17,410

∆Div/Assets

N
Chi2-test of diff in coeffs.

2.66*
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Table 9: Do peer effects on dividends increase over time?
Column 1 (2) shows estimates from OLS regressions (second stage of 2SLS regressions) of Div/Assets ratio of a
firm. In column 2, the peer dividend ratio and its interaction is the predicted value from the first-stage regression.
The sample consists of all dividend-paying nonfinancial, nonutility firms which initiated dividends during the
sample period, and includes observations during and after the dividend initiation years. The dependent variable is
total cash dividends paid over a year, divided by total assets (Div/Assets). YearsSinceInitiation is the number of
years after a firm initiated dividends. Peer firms are defined as all other firms in a firm’s three-digit SIC industry
code that year. The models are estimated using the full set of control variables (not tabulated) as in Table 5. All
models include year fixed-effects. The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm dependence, and
are shown in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 0.5%. ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
Div/Assets

(2)
Div/Assets
(2SLS – 2nd
Stage)

0.015**
(2.03)

0.023**
(2.35)

Peer Div/Assets§

0.089
(1.22)

-0.115
(-0.74)

YearsSinceInitiation

-0.000***
(-2.64)

-0.000***
(-2.79)

N
R2

13,653
0.259

13,653
0.256

YearsSinceInitiation
* Peer Div/Assets§

§

Instrumented in model 2.
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